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PERSONAL JURISDICTION ON THE MOVE
KIRSTEN M. CASTAÑEDA*

ABSTRACT
In Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial District Court, the
U.S. Supreme Court clarified the standards for establishing specific personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant in federal court. The Court rejected previous interpretations of
specific jurisdiction that required a causal connection between
the defendant’s forum contacts and the plaintiff’s alleged facts.
This reorientation has had a ripple effect on specific personal
jurisdiction inquiries in federal and state courts across the nation, including courts in the Fifth Circuit and Texas. This Article
passes through the basics of general jurisdiction en route to a
more leisurely exploration of the clarified specific jurisdiction
standards and the ways in which it already has been applied in
various federal and state courts. In addition, this Article swings
by the Texas Supreme Court’s latest opinion on jurisdictional
discovery. Buckle up for this scenic tour of personal jurisdiction,
on the move.
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THE STARTING POINT FOR PERSONAL JURISDICTION
IN TEXAS

“T

EXAS COURTS MAY ASSERT personal jurisdiction over
a nonresident if (1) the Texas long-arm statute authorizes the exercise of jurisdiction and (2) the exercise of jurisdiction is consistent with federal due-process guarantees.”1 “The
plaintiff bears the initial burden of pleading allegations sufficient to confer jurisdiction.”2 “The burden then shifts to the defendant to negate all bases of jurisdiction in the allegations.”3
“The Texas long-arm statute broadly permits jurisdiction over
a nonresident doing ‘business in this state’ if the nonresident
‘commits a tort in whole or in part in this state.’”4 Such allegations satisfy our long-arm statute, but must also satisfy federal
due-process requirements.5 “Consistent with federal due process
protections, a state may assert personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant only if the defendant has established ‘minimum contacts’ with the forum state such that maintenance of
the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’”6
1 Luciano v. SprayFoamPolymers.com, LLC, 625 S.W.3d 1, 8 (Tex. 2021) (citing TV Azteca v. Ruiz, 490 S.W.3d 29, 36 (Tex. 2016)).
2 Id. (citing Moki Mac River Expeditions v. Drugg, 221 S.W.3d 569, 574 (Tex.
2007)).
3 Id. (citing Moki Mac, 221 S.W.3d at 574).
4 Id. (quoting TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 17.042(2)).
5 Id.
6 Id. (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)).
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THE FORK IN THE ROAD

“A defendant’s contacts with the forum can give rise to either
general or specific jurisdiction.”7
A.

GENERAL JURISDICTION

“A court has general jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant whose ‘affiliations with the State are so “continuous and
systematic” as to render [it] essentially at home in the forum
State.’”8 This standard requires “substantial activities” within the
forum.9 A court with general jurisdiction may exercise jurisdiction even if the claim at issue does not arise from or relate to the
defendant’s contacts with the forum state.10
The “substantial activities” standard employs “a more demanding minimum contacts analysis than for specific jurisdiction.”11 For example, mere purchases, even if occurring at
regular intervals, are not enough to support general jurisdiction.12 Purchasing helicopters, equipment, and training services
from a Texas company; sending employees to Texas for training; and sending the CEO to Houston for contract negotiation
is insufficient.13 The substantial activities must be sufficient to
render the defendant essentially “at home” in the forum state.14
The Dallas Court of Appeals addressed general jurisdiction in
a 2021 opinion.15 Plaintiffs Forever Living Products International, LLC (Forever Living) and Aloe Vera of America, Inc.
(AVA) produced and marketed aloe vera products around the
world.16 AVA’s former vice president, Hardy, and other former
Forever Living employees created an aloe vera business called
AloeVeritas.17 Hardy was manager of HW&B Enterprises, LLC
Id. (citing Spir Star AG v. Kimich, 310 S.W.3d 868, 872 (Tex. 2010)).
TV Azteca v. Ruiz, 490 S.W.3d 29, 37 (Tex. 2016) (quoting Daimler AG v.
Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 119 (2014)).
9 BMC Software Belg., N.V. v. Marchand, 83 S.W.3d 789, 797 (Tex. 2002).
10 Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 141 S. Ct. 1017, 1024
(2021); TV Azteca, 490 S.W.3d at 37.
11 BMC Software, 83 S.W.3d at 797 (quoting CSR Ltd. v. Link, 925 S.W.2d 591,
595 (Tex. 1996)).
12 Helicopteros Nacionales de Colom., S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 417 (1984).
13 Id. at 415–16.
14 See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 127 (2014); TV Azteca, 490 S.W.3d
at 37.
15 See Forever Living Prods. Int’l, LLC v. AV Eur. GmbH, 638 S.W.3d 719, 719
(Tex. App.—Dallas 2021, no pet.).
16 Id. at 722.
17 Id.
7
8
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(HW&B), the holding company that owned AloeVeritas entities,
including AV Europe.18 After successfully arbitrating claims
against Hardy, Forever Living and AVA sued HW&B, AloeVeritas
Americas, and AV Europe for tortious interference.19
AV Europe asserted “it [was] a German entity with no office or
facility outside Germany.”20 From July 2016 through September/October 2017, “AV Europe’s managing director was
Thomas Reichert, a German resident.”21 From September/October 2017 until November 2017, AV Europe’s managing director was Sean Higgins, a United Kingdom resident.22 But in
November 2017, Hardy, a Texas resident, became managing director and remained so at the time of the lawsuit.23 AV Europe
stopped conducting business in June 2018 and had no employees by the time the lawsuit was filed.24
The court of appeals, construing the plaintiffs’ pleading
under “Texas’s liberal notice-pleading standards,” concluded
that plaintiffs alleged AV Europe’s nerve center was in Texas by
alleging that AV Europe “[wa]s operating in Dallas County,”
Texas.25 A company is subject to general jurisdiction in the state
of its principal place of business.26 The principal place of business, often referred to as a company’s nerve center, is “the place
where [the company’s] officers direct, control, and coordinate
the [company’s] activities.”27 Thus, the Dallas Court of Appeals’
inquiry focused on “where AV Europe’s officers directed, controlled, and coordinated the company’s activities as of January
2019, when suit was filed.”28
There was no evidence that Hardy or any other AV Europe
officer directed, controlled, or coordinated AV Europe’s activities from Texas in January 2019.29 But the evidence showed that
Id.
Id.
20 Id.
21 Id. at 726.
22 Id.
23 Id.
24 Id.
25 Id. at 724. But see id. at 731 (Schenck, J., dissenting) (“Nowhere in the petition is general jurisdiction asserted . . .”).
26 Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 137 (2014).
27 Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 92–93 (2010).
28 Forever Living, 638 S.W.3d at 726 (citing Ascentium Capital LLC v. HighTech the Sch. of Cosmetology Corp., 558 S.W.3d 824, 829, 831 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, no pet.)).
29 Id. at 727.
18
19
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Hardy, the managing director, lived in Texas full-time and was
“winding down” AV Europe’s business, “which implie[d] some
level of activity.”30 Because the plaintiffs alleged a Texas nerve
center, the burden shifted to AV Europe to prove that Hardy was
not directing, controlling, or coordinating AV Europe’s activities
from Texas in January 2019.31
The court of appeals held “that AV Europe produced legally
insufficient evidence to negate general-jurisdiction minimum
contacts with Texas.”32 The court also held that AV Europe did
not present a compelling case that the exercise of personal jurisdiction would offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.33 Accordingly, the court reversed the trial court’s
order granting AV Europe’s special appearance, denied the special appearance, and remanded the case to the trial court for
further proceedings.34
B.

SPECIFIC JURISDICTION

As opposed to general jurisdiction, specific jurisdiction requires that (1) the defendant take some act by which it purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within
the forum state and (2) the plaintiff’s claims arise out of or relate to the defendant’s contacts with the forum.35 Under the first
prong, “the contacts must be the defendant’s choice and not
‘random, isolated, or fortuitous.’”36 “They must show that the
defendant deliberately ‘reached out beyond’ its home—by, for
example, ‘exploi[ting] a market’ in the forum State . . .”37 The
second prong requires that there is “an affiliation between the
forum and the underlying controversy.”38 The jurisdictional inquiry is conducted on a claim-by-claim basis.39
Id.
Id. at 726.
32 Id. at 728.
33 Id.
34 Id. at 729.
35 Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 141 S. Ct. 1017, 1024–25
(2021).
36 Id. at 1025 (quoting Keeton v. Hustler Mag., Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 774 (1984)).
37 Id. (quoting Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 285 (2014)).
38 Id. (quoting Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 137 S. Ct. 1773,
1780 (2017)).
39 Moncrief Oil Int’l Inc. v. OAO Gazprom, 414 S.W.3d 142, 150 (Tex. 2013).
30
31
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NEW SPECIFIC JURISDICTION GUIDEPOSTS

ARISING OUT

OF OR

RELATED

TO:

FORD

AND

LUCIANO

In Ford Motor Co., the U.S. Supreme Court clarified the parameters for the second prong, requiring an “affiliation between the
forum and the underlying controversy.”40 This affiliation need
not be causal in nature.41 The Supreme Court rejected the argument that “arise out of or relate to” requires that the defendant’s forum conduct gave rise to the plaintiff’s claims.42
As the Court explained:
None of our precedents has suggested that only a strict causal
relationship between the defendant’s in-state activity and the litigation will do. As just noted, our most common formulation of
the rule demands that the suit “arise out of or relate to the defendant’s contacts with the forum.” The first half of that standard
asks about causation; but the back half, after the “or,” contemplates that some relationships will support jurisdiction without a
causal showing.43

The rejected causal-connection test might limit specific jurisdiction to the states of design, manufacture, and first sale in
some cases. However, the “relate to” aspect of the “arise out of or
relate to” test allows specific jurisdiction in other states based on
other activities or occurrences involving the defendant.44 Thus,
in cases ranging from Ford Motor Co. back to World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,45 the U.S. Supreme Court has held that
specific jurisdiction attaches when a company serves a market
for a product in the forum state and the product malfunctions
there.46
When a company “‘has continuously and deliberately exploited [a State’s] market, it must reasonably anticipate being
haled into [that State’s] court[s]’ to defend actions ‘based on’
products causing injury there.”47
40 Ford Motor Co., 141 S. Ct. at 1025 (quoting Bristol-Myers Squibb, 137 S. Ct. at
1780).
41 Id. at 1026.
42 Id.
43 Id. (internal citations omitted).
44 See id.
45 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
46 See Ford Motor Co., 141 S. Ct. at 1027; World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297.
47 Ford Motor Co., 141 S. Ct. at 1027 (quoting Keeton v. Hustler Mag., Inc., 465
U.S. 770, 771 (1984)) (citing Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462,
472–73 (1985)).
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[I]f the sale of a product of a manufacturer or distributor . . . is
not simply an isolated occurrence, but arises from the efforts of
the manufacturer or distributor to serve, directly or indirectly,
the market for its product in [the forum] State[ ], it is not unreasonable to subject it to suit in [the forum] State[ ] if its allegedly
defective merchandise has there been the source of injury to its
owner or to others.48

In Luciano, the Texas Supreme Court announced that it
“appl[ies] the Supreme Court’s precedent to determine”
whether a suit arises out of or relates to the defendant’s Texas
contacts so as to establish specific jurisdiction.49 More specifically, the Texas Supreme Court confirmed that its Luciano holding “rests on the Supreme Court’s analysis in Ford Motor Co. . . .
to determine whether a product liability lawsuit ‘arise[s] out of
or relate[s] to’ a nonresident defendant’s contacts with the forum state.”50 The purposeful availment prong—which the Ford
Motor Co. parties agreed was met51—continues to be governed by
the same standards that are based on federal jurisprudence.52
1.

Using Facts Showing Systematic Service of a Market in the Forum
State for the Same Type of Product/Activity

Whereas the facts in Ford Motor Co. exemplify a situation in
which a company has served a market for a product “[b]y every
means imaginable,” the facts in Luciano demonstrate that the
“arise out of or relate to” prong of specific jurisdiction can be
established by contacts with the forum state that are far fewer
and by no means pervasive.53 It is useful to compare Ford Motor
Co. and Luciano as disparate examples of facts that meet the specific jurisdiction standards and also to examine two other situations the U.S. Supreme Court used as examples of facts that fall
short.
Id. (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297); see also Goodyear
Dunlop Tires Ops., S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 927 (2011) (reciting same WorldWide Volkswagen quote); Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Ct. of Cal., 480 U.S.
102, 110 (1987) (same).
49 Luciano v. SprayFoamPolymers.com, LLC, 625 S.W.3d 1, 16 (Tex. 2021).
50 Id. at 16 n.5.
51 Ford Motor Co., 141 S. Ct. at 1026.
52 See, e.g., Luciano, 625 S.W.3d at 9 (in discussing purposeful availment, citing
both state and federal case law).
53 Compare Ford Motor Co., 141 S. Ct. at 1028 (finding pervasive and extensive
contacts satisfy the “related to” prong), with Luciano, 625 S.W.3d at 17–19 (finding two contacts satisfy the “related to” prong).
48
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Ford Motor Co. and Luciano: Contacts That Meet the
Standard

Ford advertised, sold, and serviced the vehicles at issue in the
two lawsuits the Court reviewed (an Explorer in one and a
Crown Victoria in the other) in both forum states (Montana and
Minnesota) for many years.54 Ford urged Montanans and Minnesotans to buy its vehicles, including but not limited to the Explorer and Crown Victoria, by means including “billboards, TV
and radio spots, print ads, and direct mail.”55 Ford sold its vehicles, including the Explorer and Crown Victoria in many dealerships throughout both states.56 In addition to sales, Ford
fostered ongoing connections with Ford vehicle owners by maintaining and repairing Ford vehicles at dealerships in both states
and distributing parts to dealers and independent auto shops in
both states.57 These activities also “encourage[d] Montanans
and Minnesotans to become lifelong Ford drivers.”58
At the other end of the spectrum, in Luciano, the defendant
SprayFoamPolymers.com, LLC (SprayFoam) contracted with a
single sales representative in Texas and utilized one Texas distribution center.59 SprayFoam retained Preston Nix as an independent contractor sales representative and “‘sold through him for
a period of time . . . in the State of Texas.’”60 Nix’s independent
contractor status was irrelevant to the inquiry into whether
SprayFoam’s own conduct was directed towards marketing and
distributing its products in Texas.61 Although there was no data
on the volume of sales realized through Nix’s efforts,
SprayFoam had used his “boots on the ground” to “tap[ ] into
the local market and reap[ ] economic benefits from his sales.”62
The role of this single salesperson “evince[d] SprayFoam’s ‘intent or purpose’ to target the Texas market.”63 And by hiring
just one salesman who resided in Texas, “SprayFoam ‘enjoy[ed]
the benefits and protection of the laws’ of Texas.”64
Ford Motor Co., 141 S. Ct. at 1019.
Id. at 1028.
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 Luciano v. SprayFoamPolymers.com, LLC, 625 S.W.3d 1, 16 (Tex. 2021).
60 Id. at 11.
61 Id.
62 Id. at 12.
63 Id. (quoting Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Ct. of Cal., 480 U.S. 102, 112
(1987)).
64 Id. (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945)).
54
55
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SprayFoam also acquired a single warehouse space to maintain
a stock of merchandise in Texas.65 The record did not establish
whether SprayFoam also maintained warehouse space in other,
non-Texas locations, but such a determination was unnecessary
“because only SprayFoam’s Texas contacts are relevant for the
specific-jurisdiction analysis.”66 And although SprayFoam argued
that it maintained a Texas distribution center only as a byproduct of an agreement with a Colorado-based logistics company (Acme) that ran the warehouse, the evidence showed that
SprayFoam contracted with Acme in the Dallas/Fort Worth
(DFW) area, arranged to store some SprayFoam products at the
DFW warehouse, and directed Acme to ship from the DFW
warehouse supplies to customers.67 The Texas Supreme Court
concluded that these facts “show[ed] that the location of the
warehouse was neither adventitious nor thrust upon
SprayFoam.”68
The Lucianos also argued that the Texas location of the thirdparty company that purchased and installed SprayFoam’s product supported specific jurisdiction.69 However, the Texas Supreme Court held that mere knowledge that a SprayFoam
product would be sold and used in Texas, in itself, was not
enough to show purposeful availment, and it did not consider
this fact in determining relatedness.70
So in the end, the only Texas contacts on which the Texas
Supreme Court relied to find specific jurisdiction in Luciano
were:
• SprayFoam’s retention of one independent-contractor
sales representative in Texas; and
• SprayFoam’s use of one warehouse space in Texas.71
The court concluded that these contacts supported the conclusion that “SprayFoam ‘served a market’ in Texas ‘for the very
[spray foam insulation] that the plaintiffs allege malfunctioned
and injured them’ in Texas.”72 Accordingly, the court found “a
Id. at 10.
Id. at 11 n.3.
67 Id. at 11.
68 Id. (internal citations omitted); see also id. (“[W]hile SprayFoam downplays
the role of Acme’s warehouse, Acme stored and delivered insulation at
SprayFoam’s direction and on SprayFoam’s dime.”).
69 Id. at 12.
70 Id. at 13.
71 Id. at 13–14.
72 Id. at 17 (quoting Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 141 S.
Ct. 1017, 1028 (2021)).
65
66
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strong ‘relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the
litigation’—the ‘essential foundation’ of specific jurisdiction.”73
To establish that the plaintiff’s claims arose out of or related to
the defendant’s contacts with the forum, Luciano was not required to establish that the exact barrel of spray foam installed
in their home was sold by the Texas sales representative or distributed from the Texas warehouse.74 Rather, it was “sufficient
that SprayFoam intended to serve a Texas market for the insulation that the Lucianos allege[d] injured them in this lawsuit.”75
Consistent with the shifting burden that requires the defendant to negate all bases of jurisdiction alleged by the plaintiff,76
the Texas Supreme Court examined both the Lucianos’ allegations and SprayFoam’s responses. For example, the Lucianos alleged that SprayFoam sold Thermoseal 500 (the spray foam
product installed in the Lucianos’ home) in Texas.77 The court
noted that “SprayFoam does not contend that the sale of Thermoseal 500 to [the installer] was an ‘isolated occurrence’ in
Texas.”78
Although the degree by which the respective defendants serviced the forum-state market differed dramatically between Ford
and Luciano, both defendants were subject to specific jurisdiction in the forum.79 In each instance, the defendant systematically served a market in the forum state for the very product that
the plaintiffs alleged malfunctioned in that state.80 That linkage
shows “a strong ‘relationship among the defendant, the forum,
and the litigation,’” which is “the ‘essential foundation’ of specific jurisdiction.”81 Ford and Luciano serve as useful bookends
for the range of contacts that will support specific jurisdiction.
b.

Bristol-Myers and Walden: Contacts That Fail the Standard

In contrast with the facts presented in Ford and Luciano, the
U.S. Supreme Court provided two examples of facts that will not
support specific jurisdiction. In Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior
Id. (quoting Ford Motor Co., 141 S. Ct. at 1028).
See id.
75 Id. (citing Ford Motor Co., 141 S. Ct. at 1028).
76 See id. at 17 n.6.
77 Id. at 17.
78 Id. (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297
(1980)).
79 Ford Motor Co., 141 S. Ct. at 1032; Luciano, 625 S.W.3d at 19.
80 Ford Motor Co., 141 S. Ct. at 1028; Luciano, 625 S.W.3d at 17.
81 Ford Motor Co., 141 S. Ct. at 1028 (quoting Helicopteros Nacionales de
Colom., S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 (1984)).
73
74
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Court of California, San Francisco County,82 the plaintiffs sued in
California state court for alleged injuries from taking Plavix.83
Many of the plaintiffs were not California residents, had not
been prescribed Plavix in California, had not ingested Plavix in
California, and had not been injured in California.84 The plaintiffs could establish Bristol-Myers’s connection with California
(i.e., servicing a Plavix market there), but could not show any
connection between California and their Plavix-related claims.85
In Walden v. Fiore,86 the plaintiffs had the opposite problem.
The plaintiffs sued in Nevada state court for alleged injuries
from seizure of their money at an Atlanta airport by a Georgia
police officer.87 The plaintiffs were Nevada residents and experienced the effects of the officer’s conduct there.88 However, the
officer had never traveled to, conducted activities within, contacted anyone in, or sent anything or anyone to Nevada.89 Although the plaintiffs could establish a connection between their
claims and Nevada, they could not show any connection between Nevada and the defendant.90
The linkage in Ford Motor Co. and Luciano missing in BristolMyers and Walden is that the defendant systematically served a
market in the forum state for the very product that the plaintiffs
alleged malfunctioned in that state.91 Although the degree by
which the respective defendants serviced the forum state market
differed dramatically between Ford Motor Co. and Luciano, the
relationship—not the pervasiveness of the contacts—established
jurisdiction.92 Indeed, “a single contact can support jurisdiction
if that contact creates a ‘substantial connection’ with the
forum.”93
137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017).
Id. at 1777.
84 Id. at 1778.
85 Id. at 1781.
86 571 U.S. 277 (2014).
87 Id. at 279–80.
88 Id. at 281.
89 Id. at 289.
90 Id. at 291.
91 Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 141 S. Ct. 1017, 1028
(2021); Luciano v. SprayFoamPolymers.com, LLC, 625 S.W.3d 1, 17 (Tex. 2021).
92 See Ford Motor Co., 141 S. Ct. at 1028; Luciano, 625 S.W.3d at 17.
93 Moki Mac River Expeditions v. Drugg, 221 S.W.3d 569, 577 (Tex. 2007); see
also Luciano, 625 S.W.3d at 12.
82
83
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The Importance of Defining the Type of Product/Activity

An important component of establishing that a defendant systematically serves a market for the type of product at issue is
defining what the product is. In evaluating specific jurisdiction
over different defendants in the same case, a court may consider
different products. For example, in an airplane-crash case where
one defendant manufactured an aircraft engine and another defendant manufactured the aircraft into which the engine was integrated, the first defendant’s market was the type of aircraft
engine at issue, while the second defendant’s market was the
type of aircraft at issue.94
In Johnson v. TheHuffingtonPost.com, Inc.,95 the majority and
dissenting opinions differed in their assessment of the product
at issue. The plaintiff sued TheHuffingtonPost.com (HuffPost)
for libel based on statements in an article posted on HuffPost’s
website.96 The majority viewed the product as the libel in the
article.97 The dissent viewed the product as the HuffPost
publication.98
To determine whether a website provided the contacts required for specific jurisdiction, the majority examined whether
the interactive website involved contacts that met the specific
jurisdiction standards.99 “What matters is whether HuffPost
aimed the alleged libel at Texas.”100 The article from which the
libel claim arose had no ties to Texas.101 The majority concluded
that merchandise sold to Texans through the website, the ads
shown to Texas site visitors, and the tailoring of ads to show
Texas-based ads to visitors located in Texas “neither produced
nor relate to Johnson’s libel claim.”102 Ultimately, the majority
concluded that HuffPost was not subject to personal jurisdiction
in Texas.103
The dissent, on the other hand, viewed the product as the
HuffPost publication.104 The dissent noted that the plaintiff had
See LNS Enters. LLC v. Cont’l Motors, Inc., 22 F.4th 852, 857 (9th Cir. 2022).
See 21 F.4th 314 (5th Cir. 2021).
96 Id. at 316.
97 Id. at 319.
98 Id. at 329 (Haynes, J., dissenting).
99 Id. at 318 (majority opinion).
100 Id. at 321.
101 Id. at 319.
102 Id. at 320–21.
103 Id. at 316.
104 Id. at 329 (Haynes, J., dissenting).
94
95
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not sued the author of the article, but instead the publisher.105
In Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., the U.S. Supreme Court held
that a publisher’s “regular circulation of magazines in the forum
State is sufficient to support an assertion of jurisdiction in a libel
action based on the contents of the magazine.”106 “When a publication ‘continuously and deliberately exploit[s] [a] market, it
must reasonably anticipate being haled into court there in a libel action based on the contents of its magazine.’”107 The First,
Second, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits
have all analyzed Keeton in the context of internet publications
without restricting Keeton to print publications.108
In Johnson, the dissent noted that HuffPost purposefully and
regularly circulated its publication in Texas, tailoring Texasbased ads in the publication to readers in Texas locations.109
HuffPost actively sought Texas readers and the money generated from selling ads to those targeting Texas consumers.110
HuffPost availed itself of the benefit of Texas readership
through money it made from selling Texas-specific advertising.111 As part of serving the Texas market, HuffPost circulated
its publication—i.e., the articles it posted—to Texas readers.112
The plaintiff alleged he was injured by one of those articles.113
As in Ford Motor Co., “That link—between the article that injured
Johnson (who [was] in Texas) and HuffPost purposely circulating articles to Texas—supports specific jurisdiction.”114
The dissent observed that, despite the rejection of a causalconnection standard in Ford Motor Co., “the majority opinion
seems to suggest that only if the (extensive) Texas-based advertising caused the lawsuit might there by jurisdiction.”115 This appears to be true. Although the majority opinion recites the
105
106
107

Id.
Keeton v. Hustler Mag., Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 773–74 (1984).
Johnson, 21 F.4th at 328 (Haynes, J., dissenting) (quoting Keeton, 465 U.S. at

781).
Id. at 330.
Id. at 331; see also Hood v. Am. Auto Care, LLC, 21 F.4th 1216, 1225 (10th
Cir. 2021) (quoting Old Republic Ins. Co. v. Cont’l Motors, Inc., 877 F.3d 895,
917 n.35 (10th Cir. 2017) (noting that, in cases involving websites, the Tenth
Circuit “ask[s] whether the defendant intended its online content to create effects specifically in the forum state”)).
110 Johnson, 21 F.4th at 331 (Haynes, J., dissenting).
111 Id.
112 Id.
113 Id.
114 See id.
115 Id.
108
109
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“relates to” portion of the standard, it held that “HuffPost may
avoid the authority of Texas’s courts by not purposefully directing at Texas the conduct that PRODUCED Johnson’s suit.”116
The different approaches in the majority and dissenting opinions highlight the critical importance of defining the type of
product or activity at issue.117
3.

Application of Ford Motor Co. in Federal and Texas Courts

In the months since Ford Motor Co. was decided, a variety of
courts have addressed the opinion and applied it to specific jurisdiction inquiries.
a.

Federal Circuit Courts

In addition to the Fifth Circuit’s Johnson opinion discussed
above, other federal circuit courts have addressed Ford Motor Co.
in recent cases. Motus, LLC v. CarData Consultants, Inc. involved
an attempt to exercise specific jurisdiction in Massachusetts over
CarData Consultants, Inc. (CarData) for alleged trademark infringement regarding a phrase in the meta title of its website.118
Although the court mentioned Ford Motor Co. in discussing the
applicable standards, the court’s analysis focused on purposeful
availment.119 Motus, LLC (Motus) did not allege that CarData
sought to serve a Massachusetts market; rather, its allegations
focused on nationwide activities and offices in other states.120
Although “CarData’s website identifie[d] means for potential
customers—including those in Massachusetts—to reach out to
CarData,” the record did not indicate that a single Massachusetts resident had accepted the invitation, and “nothing in the
record indicat[ed] that CarData ha[d] initiated any contacts
with, or ha[d] responded to, any Massachusetts residents.”121
Motus argued that the mere use of the phrase in the website’s
meta title that infringed Motus’s trademark directed an intentional tort at a Massachusetts resident (Motus).122 But trademark
Id. at 323 (majority opinion) (emphasis added).
See id. at 326; see also Hood v. Am. Auto Care, LLC, 21 F.4th 1216, 1225
(10th Cir. 2021) (defining type of activity as telemarketing calls to sell vehicle
warranties, not calls to Vermont telephone numbers).
118 See Motus, LLC v. CarData Consultants, Inc., 23 F.4th 115, 119 (1st Cir.
2022).
119 Id. at 125.
120 Id.
121 Id.
122 Id.
116
117
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infringement does not require knowledge that the defendant “is
infringing another’s mark” or knowledge about where the plaintiff is located.123 Thus, one could not infer from the alleged intentional tort itself that CarData had directed its conduct to
Massachusetts.124 On the record before it, the court held that no
specific jurisdiction existed.125
LNS Enterprises LLC v. Continental Motors, Inc. involved attempts to exercise personal jurisdiction in Arizona over Textron
Aviation, Inc. (Textron) and Continental Motors, Inc. (Continental) with regard to an aircraft and engine involved in a nonfatal crash in Arizona.126 With regard to Textron, the plaintiff
also did not allege “that Textron’s single Arizona service center
ever serviced [the specific] aircraft [at issue], nor [was] there
any indication that this service center even service[d] the same
type of Columbia aircraft at issue.”127 The Ninth Circuit also
noted that Textron’s connection with the subject Columbia Aircraft Manufacturing Corporation (Columbia) aircraft was limited to “specific Columbia liabilities based on certain express
written aircraft warranties” that Textron acquired through company acquisitions.128 Plaintiffs did not assert that any of their
claims fell within the warranties.129
With regard to Continental, the plaintiff did not allege that
four Arizona repair shops possibly affiliated with Continental
had serviced either the specific engine at issue or the same type
of engine.130 The Ninth Circuit also found that the following
items were insufficient to support specific jurisdiction:
• Allegations of Continental’s nationwide contacts.131
• Assertions in appellate briefs that were not properly before
the court.132
• Allegations in the pleadings that were contradicted by
Continental’s affidavits.133
123 Id. at 126 (citing Borinquen Biscuit Corp. v. M.V. Trading Corp., 443 F.3d
112, 116 (1st Cir. 2006)).
124 Id.
125 Id. at 128.
126 LNS Enters. LLC v. Cont’l Motors, Inc., 22 F.4th 852, 856–57 (9th Cir.
2022).
127 Id. at 864.
128 Id.
129 Id.
130 Id. at 863.
131 Id. at 862.
132 Id.
133 Id. at 862–63.
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•

Allegations of relationships with third-party mechanics unaffiliated with Continental.134
Atchley v. AstraZeneca UK Ltd. involved attempts to exercise specific jurisdiction in a U.S. federal court over six foreign suppliers
of medical goods that allegedly violated the Anti-Terrorism Act
(ATA) by securing lucrative medical-supply contracts with Iraq’s
Ministry of Health by giving corrupt payments and valuable gifts
to the known terrorist group controlling the Ministry.135 The
plaintiffs alleged that the defendants delivered cash kickbacks to
the terrorists, who gave them business and delivered off-thebooks batches of medical supplies that the terrorist group sold
to fund its operations and pay terrorist fighters.136 The relevant
forum in this case was the United States as a whole.137
“[T]he six foreign supplier defendants reached into the
United States to contract with an affiliated U.S. manufacturer to
be the manufacturer’s exclusive agent in Iraq.”138 Continuously
over a period of years, each supplier-defendant sourced goods
manufactured in the United States to fulfill the Iraqi contracts
they secured.139 The purported ATA-violating bribes arose from
or related to these U.S. contacts “in at least four overlapping
ways.”140
• The supplier-defendants’ collaboration with the U.S. manufacturers to market U.S. products in Iraq was the basis for
their interactions with the terrorist group.
• The products to be distributed through the interactions
with the terrorist group were manufactured in the United
States.
• The alleged ATA violation was part of the manner in
which the supplier-defendants secured a market for the
U.S.-manufactured products.
• Plaintiffs alleged that the terrorist group specified that the
U.S. provenance of the medical goods was material.141
The D.C. Circuit held that, among other things, the analysis
in Ford Motor Co. of the “arise out of or relate to” standard sup134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141

Id.
See
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 863.
Atchley v. AstraZeneca UK Ltd., 22 F.4th 204, 209 (D.C. Cir. 2022).
at 232.
at 233.
at 234.
at 234–36.
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ported the court’s conclusion that the specific jurisdiction standards were met.142
Hood v. American Auto Care, LLC involved attempts to exercise
personal jurisdiction in Colorado over American Auto Care,
LLC (AAC) in a putative class action based on alleged violations
of the federal Telephone Consumer Protection Act.143 Shortly
after purchasing a used car, Hood, a Colorado resident, began
receiving telemarketing calls from AAC to sell him a vehicle warranty.144 Hood’s “cell phone number had a Vermont area code”
because “[h]e had previously lived in Vermont.”145 The record
established that AAC directed the same type of telemarketing
efforts to Vermont and Colorado.146 The Tenth Circuit reasoned that “[i]f AAC places telemarketing calls to sell service
contracts to Vermont and Colorado residents alike, it does not
matter that they called Mr. Hood from a list of apparent Vermont residents rather than a list of apparent Colorado residents.”147 The court noted that it “might not apply that
proposition if there was a substantial relevant difference between calls placed to residents of the two states.”148
The court rejected AAC’s attempts to characterize the activity
at issue as “calling Vermont phone numbers.”149 Instead, the
court considered the activity to be telemarketing calls to sell vehicle warranties.150 “[W]hen the content of the solicitation calls
is essentially the same whether calling a Vermont number or a
Colorado number, it is appropriate to say that residents of both
States receive the same ‘model’ call.”151
The court also rejected the argument “that purposeful direction must be based solely on the contacts that generated the
cause of action.”152 Although the U.S. Supreme Court did not
address purposeful availment in Ford Motor Co., the Tenth Circuit held that “AAC’s argument is incompatible with the [Supreme] Court’s conclusion that purposefully directed in-state
contacts can be sufficiently related to the plaintiff’s injury de142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152

Id. at 237.
Hood v. Am. Auto Care, LLC, 21 F.4th 1216, 1219–20 (10th Cir. 2021).
Id. at 1220.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1224.
Id.
Id. at 1225.
See id.
Id.
Id. at 1226.
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spite the absence of a causal connection.”153 “The whole point
of Ford was that it is enough if the activity forming the basis of
the claim against the defendant is related to the activity of the
defendant that establishes that it ‘purposefully directed [its] activities at residents of the forum.’”154
Hepp v. Facebook involved attempts to exercise personal jurisdiction in Pennsylvania over Reddit (an online forum for “communities” organized around topics) and Imgur (a photo-sharing
website) based on alleged violations of Pennsylvania’s right of
publicity statute.155 A photo of Hepp, a Philadelphia television
host, was posted to Imgur, and a Reddit user posted a link to the
Imgur post.156 The photo had been taken without Hepp’s knowledge or consent and posted/linked without her
authorization.157
Hepp alleged facts showing that Imgur and Reddit purposefully availed themselves of the Pennsylvania market and targeted
advertising business to Pennsylvania.158 “She allege[d] Imgur
ha[d] an online merchandise store that [sold] products to
Pennsylvanians” and that Reddit had a “premium membership
business and an online community organized around Philadelphia.”159 However, Hepp did not establish that any “of these
contacts form[ed] a strong connection to the misappropriation
of Hepp’s likeness.”160 This portion of the opinion focuses on
the specific image at issue, rather than images generally.161 The
Third Circuit observed that Hepp failed to “allege the merchandise featured her photo,” that “Imgur and Reddit used her likeness to sell advertising,” or that “the photo was taken, uploaded,
or hosted in Pennsylvania.”162 The court concluded that “the alleged misappropriation [did] not relate to any of the contacts,”
thus defeating specific jurisdiction.163
Trimble Inc. v. PerDiemCo LLC involved attempts to exercise
specific jurisdiction over PerDiemCo LLC (PerDiemCo) in California to decide declaratory judgment claims regarding allega153
154
155
156
157
158
159
160
161
162
163

Id.
Id.
See
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

(quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985)).
Hepp v. Facebook, 14 F.4th 204, 207 (3d Cir. 2021).
at 206.
at 208.
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tions of patent infringement.164 “A patentee should not subject
itself to personal jurisdiction in a forum solely by informing a
party who happens to be located there of suspected infringement . . . .”165 However, additional communications directed
into the forum “threatening suit or proposing settlement or patent licenses can be sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction.”166 For example, just as sales of a type of vehicle in a forum
state in Ford Motor Co. can support personal jurisdiction, so can
attempts to extract nonexclusive patent licenses from a resident
of the forum state.167
PerDiemCo directed at least twenty-two communications to
Trimble Inc. (Trimble), a California resident, attempting to settle an infringement dispute, in part by offering a nonexclusive
license to PerDiemCo’s patents.168 During these communications, PerDiemCo asserted that Trimble had infringed on
PerDiemCo’s patents and threatened to sue Trimble for patent
infringement.169 Before PerDiemCo did so, Trimble filed a declaratory judgment action in the Northern District of
California.170
Rather than simply informing Trimble of suspected infringement, “PerDiemCo repeatedly contacted Trimble . . . in California, accumulating an extensive number of contacts with the
forum in a short period of time.”171 These contacts included amplifying threats of infringement, enlarging PerDiemCo’s assertions to include more of its patents and more of Trimble’s
products, and making specific threats to sue Trimble (including
identification of retained counsel and the “venue in which
[PerDiemCo] planned to file suit”).172 These contacts also included attempts to extract a nonexclusive license, i.e., “an armslength negotiation in anticipation of a long-term continuing
business relationship” in the forum state.173
See Trimble Inc. v. PerDiemCo LLC, 997 F.3d 1147, 1150 (Fed. Cir. 2021).
Id. at 1154 (quoting Red Wing Shoe Co. v. Hockerson-Halberstadt, Inc.,
148 F.3d 1355, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 1998)).
166 Id. at 1155.
167 See id. at 1156.
168 Id. at 1151.
169 Id.
170 Id. at 1151–52.
171 Id. at 1157.
172 Id.
173 Id. (quoting Red Wing Shoe Co. v. Hockerson-Halberstadt, Inc., 148 F.3d
1355, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 1998)).
164
165
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Texas Courts of Appeals

A slew of Texas courts of appeals opinions have addressed specific jurisdiction in light of Ford and Luciano. Most of the opinions have found specific jurisdiction exists, either as to all claims
pleaded174 or as to some of the claims pleaded.175 A handful of
cases have found that specific jurisdiction does not exist,176 with
one remanding the case for consideration of the plaintiff’s alternative request (in the special appearance response) for jurisdictional discovery.177
B.

JURISDICTIONAL DISCOVERY

In February 2022, the Texas Supreme Court addressed the
scope of available discovery regarding personal jurisdiction
under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 120a.178 Rule 120a allows a
trial court to rule on a special appearance based on “the plead174 See, e.g., BDTP, LLC v. United Structures of Am., Inc., No. 01-20-00464-CV,
2022 WL 710087, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Mar. 10, 2022, no pet.)
(mem. op.); Capital Title of Tex., LLC v. Shank, No. 13-21-00062-CV, 2022 WL
480253, at *1 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi-Edinburg Feb. 17, 2022, no pet.)
(mem. op.); Southwire Co., LLC v. Sparks, No. 02-21-00126-CV, 2021 WL
5368692, at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Nov. 18, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.);
Weeks Marine, Inc. v. Carlos, No. 01-21-00015-CV, 2021 WL 4897714, at *1 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Oct. 21, 2021, pet. filed) (mem. op.); ShockTheory
DLV, Inc. v. Tava Ventures, Inc., No. 05-21-00182-CV, 2021 WL 4304643, at *1
(Tex. App.—Dallas Sept. 22, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.); Ford Motor Co. v. Lopez, No. 13-19-00480-CV, 2021 WL 3869733, at *1 (Tex. App.—Corpus ChristiEdinburg Aug. 31, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.); Cirrus Design Corp. v. Berra, 633
S.W.3d 640, 640 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2021, no pet.); Vertex Indus., Inc. v.
State Farm Lloyds, No. 03-20-00574-CV, 2021 WL 3684263, at *1 (Tex. App.—
Austin Aug. 20, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.); Fitzgerald Truck Parts & Sales, LLC v.
Advanced Freight Dynamics, LLC, No. 14-19-00397-CV, 2021 WL 1685353, at *1
(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Apr. 29, 2021, pet. filed) (mem. op.).
175 See, e.g., Wadi Petrol., Inc. v. Miller, No. 13-21-00014-CV, 2021 WL 4466320,
at *1 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi-Edinburg Sept. 30, 2021, pet. denied) (mem.
op.); Schrader v. Roach, No. 01-20-00183-CV, 2021 WL 3868766, at *1 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 31, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.).
176 See Devon Energy Corp. v. Moreno, No. 01-21-00084-CV, 2022 WL 547641,
at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Feb. 24, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.); Steward Health Care Sys. LLC v. Saidara, 633 S.W.3d 120, 120 (Tex. App.—Dallas
2021, no pet.); Fed. Corp. v. Truhlar, 632 S.W.3d 697, 697 (Tex. App.—El Paso
2021, pet. denied); JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Campbell, No. 09-20-00161CV, 2021 WL 2583573, at *1 (Tex. App.—Beaumont June 24, 2021, no pet.)
(mem. op.); LG Chem, Ltd. v. Granger, No. 14-19-00814-CV, 2021 WL 2153761,
at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] May 27, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.).
177 See LG Chem, Ltd. v. Turner, No. 14-19-00326-CV, 2021 WL 2154075, at *1
(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] May 27, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.).
178 In re Christianson Air Conditioning & Plumbing, LLC, 639 S.W.3d 671, 674
(Tex. 2022).
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ings, any stipulations made by and between the parties, such affidavits and attachments as may be filed by the parties, the results
of discovery processes, and any oral testimony.”179 Accordingly,
“relevant discovery” is “a vital part of resolving a special
appearance.”180
Although a trial court has discretion in ordering jurisdictional
discovery, that discretion is bounded by guiding rules and principles.181 Jurisdictional discovery is “limited to matters directly
relevant to” jurisdiction.”182 “[T]he discovery must target evidence that would make a disputed fact ‘of consequence in determining’ the [court’s jurisdiction] ‘more or less probable.’”183
Nevertheless, issues of fact material to jurisdiction may also be
material to the merits.184 For example, when specific jurisdiction
is at issue, information material to determining the existence of
a “‘connection between the defendant, the forum, and the litigation’ [may] be relevant to the merits” as well.185 Therefore,
jurisdictional discovery is not improper or disallowed simply because it also relates to the merits.186 The test is whether the information sought in jurisdictional discovery is “essential to prove at
least one disputed factor that is necessary to the plaintiff’s proposed theory or theories of personal jurisdiction.”187
In addition to this central limitation on jurisdictional discovery, there are other limitations applicable generally to discovery.188 For instance, jurisdictional discovery should be limited
under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 192.4 if “the ‘discovery
sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or is obtainable from some other source that is more convenient,’ or if ‘the
burden . . . outweighs its likely benefit.”189 Likewise, jurisdictional discovery “must be ‘reasonably tailored’ and ‘not overTEX. R. CIV. P. 120a.
Christianson, 639 S.W.3d at 676 (quoting Exito Elecs. Co. v. Trejo, 142
S.W.3d 302, 307 (Tex. 2004)).
181 See id.; see also In re Nat’l Lloyds Ins. Co., 507 S.W.3d 219, 226 (Tex. 2016).
182 Christianson, 639 S.W.3d at 676 (quoting In re Doe, 444 S.W.3d 603, 608
(Tex. 2014)).
183 Id. (quoting TEX. R. EVID. 401).
184 Id. at 676–77.
185 Id. at 677 (quoting Moki Mac River Expeditions v. Drugg, 221 S.W.3d 569,
584 (Tex. 2007)).
186 Id.
187 Id. at 678.
188 See id.
189 Id. (quoting TEX. R. CIV. P. 192.4).
179
180
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broad.’”190 Finally, jurisdictional discovery requests “must be
‘proportional,’ and not ‘overly burdensome.’”191
With regard to a jurisdictional corporate-representative deposition, the discovery should be evaluated on a topic-by-topic basis.192 For example, if the parties dispute both prongs of specific
jurisdiction, each topic must target discovery that is essential to
prove purposeful availment and relatedness.193 However, a topic
“need not be essential to all disputed factors simultaneously.”194
Simply using the phrase “in Texas” does not necessarily make a
topic essential to prove specific jurisdiction.195 Instead, the topic
as a whole must relate to a legally appropriate basis for finding
specific jurisdiction.196 In addition to geographic limits, the topics should include time and subject matter limits that tailor the
topic to avoid overbreadth.197
IV.

CONTINUING THE JOURNEY: THE DEVELOPING
STANDARDS FOR PERSONAL JURISDICTION
IN TEXAS

The new developments in personal jurisdiction case law illuminate the road with more precision but also highlight new potential potholes and obstacles. The facts—both alleged and
omitted—on which courts have relied to analyze specific jurisdiction after Ford Motor Co. provide a useful roadmap for other
situations. The resources in this Article are just the beginning of
a new leg of the journey required to establish or defeat personal
jurisdiction over nonresident defendants in federal and Texas
courts.
190 Id. (quoting In re CSX Corp., 124 S.W.3d 149, 152–53 (Tex. 2003) (orig.
proceeding)).
191 Id. (internal citation omitted).
192 Id. at 679.
193 Id.
194 Id.
195 Id. at 680.
196 Id.; see also In re Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom, LLP, No. 02-2100393-CV, 2022 WL 500036, at *4 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Feb. 18, 2022, orig.
proceeding) (mem. op.) (finding that jurisdictional request for production of
documents regarding activities performed outside Texas could not help establish
specific jurisdiction in Texas and was impermissible).
197 Christianson, 639 S.W.3d at 681.

